



Science and Justice: The Massachusetts Vitchcraft Trials. By Sanford
J. Fox. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. Pp. xix, 121. $6.95.
Twenty persons died as a consequence of prosecutions for witchcraft
in Salem, Massachusetts, in 1692. These proceedings were not the prod-
uct of isolated irrationality but, rather, were the culmination of a
period of excesses: at least eighty-three witchcraft trials resulting in
tventy-two executions were held in the American colonies between
1647 and 1691.1 The European experience was far more pervasive:
Nicholas Remy boasted in his book on demonology that within
fifteen years he had sent eight hundred persons to death for witch-
craft in Lorraine, and added that "justice has been so ably adminis-
tered at my hands that in one year sixteen witches have taken
their own lives rather than come before me." A bishop in Wiirz-
burg claimed 1900 in a five year period; another in Como, 100 in
one year; another in Nancy, 800 in 16 years; another in Bamberg,
600 in 10 years, while at Geneva, the home of Calvin, 500 were
executed in three months and the Parliament of Toulouse dis-
tinguished itself by burning 400 in a single day. A total of 7000
were said to have burned at Treves. Boquet boasted of having
burned 600 lycanthropes, and it has been asserted that the Lu-
theran, Benedict Corpzov (1595-1666), who claimed that he had
read the Bible 53 times, passed sentence on 20,000 Satanists. The
slaughter was less in England, but the official count puts the figure
at not less than 1000 people hanged or burned between 1542
and 1736. How many people were tried or otherwise persecuted
for witchcraft in Europe during the whole Christian Era is tin-
known; estimates run as high as several million .... 2
On both continents policies of persecution seem to the modern mind
to have been extended almost to self-parody: "[A] dog was put to death
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1. Drake, Witchcraft in the American Colonies, 1647-62, 20 Am. Q. 694, 697 (1963).
2. H. Smm, MAN AND His GODs 292-93 (1952).
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at Andover for bewitching several people, which balanced accounts
between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres: in the year 1474 a
diabolical rooster, for the heinous and unnatural crime of laying an egg,
had been solemnly tried, condemned and publicly burned at the stake
by the church authorities of Basle." 3
In this book, Professor Sanford J. Fox of the Boston College Law
School examines the relationship between law and science by analyzing
the Massachusetts witch trials in the light of contemporaneously evolv-
ing societal standards of verification and the resulting accumulation
of empirical knowledge. He is particularly concerned with rationalizing
the continuing vitality of an increasingly anachronistic set of beliefs
in an extension of the civilization which in 1687 had witnessed publica-
tion of Newton's Principia. His success in reconciling the prosecutions
with evidence of keen local interest in scientific advances is best mea-
sured by one of his conclusions: "[T]he witchcraft trials cannot be
viewed as entirely, or even largely, the products of superstition and col-
lective insanity. . . .Nothing short of a profound and unreasoning
devotion to the concept of monomania could maintain the belief that
the witchcraft trials are simply manifestations of mental illness."4
As Fox notes, the Puritan leaders of the Bay Colony sought to build
a community characterized by intense regard for the spiritual duties
which they recognized. They considered intolerance of nonconforming
views or actions necessary to the success of their undertaking.6 Their
religious commitment included unhesitating acceptance of an essen-
tially medieval Weltanschauung:
[I]t was an unquestioned fact that the world and man in it had
been created in six days by God the Father, an omniscient and
benevolent intelligence, for an ultimate of inscrutable purpose.
Although created perfect, man had through disobedience fallen
from grace into sin and error, thereby incurring the penalty of
eternal damnation. Yet happily a way of atonement and salvation
had been provided through the propitiatory sacrifice of God's only
begotten son. Helpless in themselves to avert the just wrath of
God, men were yet to be permitted, through his mercy, and by
humility and obedience to his will, to obtain pardon for sin and
3. Id. 294. See Huch, Der Hahn von Quakenbrilck, in DIE DEUTSCHE NOVELIE 1880-1950,
at 106 (rev. ed. H. Steinhauer ed. 1958).
4. S. Fox, SCIENCE AND JUSTICE: THE MASSACHUSETTS WITCHCRAFT TRIALS, at xv, 10-11(1968) [hereinafter -ted as Fox]. See P. MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: FROt COLONY
TO PROVINCE 191 (Beacon ed. 1961).
5. "Puritans left England .. .not because they were persecuted for their relIious
beliefs but because they were forbidden to persecute others for their beliefs." G. VIDAL,
SEX, DEATH AND MONEY 21 (1968) (emphasis in original).
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error. Life on earth was but a means to this desired end, a tempo-
rary probation for the testing of God's children. In God's ap-
pointed time, the Earthly City would come to an end, the earth
itself be swallowed up in flames. On that last day good and evil
men would be finally separated. For the recalcitrant there was
reserved a place of everlasting punishment; but the faithful would
be gathered with God in the Heavenly City, there in perfection
and felicity to dwell forever.(
Since the criminal law was considered primarily an instrument for
promotion of the godly commonwealth, many penal statutes deviated
little from their Mosaic counterparts. The Bible commands: "Thou
shalt not suffer a witch to live.' 7 That the Massachusetts settlers enacted
and enforced a statute implementing this admonition is therefore
readily explicable in terms of their heritage. The use of parallel Eng-
lish legislation, which applied automatically in the Colony on revoca-
tion of its charter in 1684, was similarly motivated.8
Analysis is required not to affirm the internal consistency of Puritan
patterns of belief but to isolate the causes of their seeming immutability
in the face of extrinsic pressures produced by scientific discovery. The
medieval system of thought had condemned empirical research and
concomitant speculation as either dangerous or irrelevant. Thus St.
Augustine had declared: "Whatever knowledge man has acquired
outside Holy Writ, if it be harmful it is there condemned; if it be
wholesome it is there contained." For centuries scholars discouraged
experiment while seeking to deduce the nature of the world from
traditionally authoritative pronouncements. Attempts of Galileo to
demonstrate the existence of Jupiter's moons by persuading doubters
to view them through his telescope proved largely abortive, since many
either refused to look on grounds of religious principle or denounced
what they saw as an illusion inspired by the devil. Confronted with
Galileo's findings, the Florentine astronomer Francesco Sizzi argued:
There are seven windows given to animals in the domicile of the
head, through which the air is admitted to the tabernacle of the
body, to enlighten, to warm, and to nourish it.... Two nostrils,
two eyes, two ears, and a mouth. So in the heavens ... there are
two favourable stars, two unpropitious, two luminaries, and Mer-
cury undecided and indifferent. From this and many other simi-
larities in nature, such as the seven metals, etc., which it were
6. C. BEcrFE, THE HFAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGIrrEF.\'H.C. "rVRY PHILOSOPERS 6 (1932).
7. Exodus 22:18.
8. See G. HAsms, LAw AND AuHo~m IN EARLY MAssAcitusrrs 141-62 (1960).
9. Quoted in H. INNis, THE BiAs OF CO.mUNIC.TIO.N 48 (1951).
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tedious to enumerate, we gather that the number of planets is
necessarily seven. Moreover, these satellites of Jupiter are invisible
to the naked eye, and therefore can exercise no influence on the
earth, and therefore would be useless, and therefore do not exist.
Besides, the Jews and other ancient nations, as well as modern
Europeans, have adopted the division of the week into seven days,
and have named them after the seven planets. Now, if we increase
the number of the planets, this whole and beautiful system falls
to the ground.10
Early scientific efforts were impeded by inability to discard established
patterns of verification. Preconceptions of necessary symmetry led Kep-
ler, who incorrectly attributed inconsistent empirical evidence to faulty
observation, to modify the Copernican system to make the sun its
central point.1 Both Descartes and Newton placed great weight on
scriptural authority. The latter struggled to discover the exact plan of
the temple of Solomon, believing it the best guide to the topography
of heaven. 12
The scholastic approach was discredited by Francis Bacon almost
a century before the Massachusetts trials:
In the year of our Lord 1432, there arose a grievous quarrel among
the brethren of a monastery over the number of teeth in the mouth
of a horse. For thirteen days the disputation raged without ceas-
ing. All the ancient books and chronicles were fetched out, and
wonderful and ponderous erudition, such as was never before
heard of in this region, was made manifest. At the beginning of
the fourteenth day, a youthful friar of goodly bearing asked his
learned superiors for permission to add a word. Straightway, to
the wonder of the disputants whose deep wisdom he sore vexed,
he beseeched them to unbend in a manner coarse and unheard
of, and to look in the mouth of a horse to find an answer to their
questionings. At this their dignity being greatly hurt, they waxed
exceeding wroth; and joining in a mighty uproar, they fell upon
him, hip and thigh, and cast him out forthwith. For, said they,
surely Satan hath tempted this bold neophyte to declare unholy
10. Quoted in J. FAHIE, GALILEO: His LIFE AND WORK 103 (1903). ,See IV. JONFS. THE
SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION (1967). A syllogism of the
Spanish theologian Tostatus, devised to verify the flatness of the earth, is a pardigI of
Scholastic reasoning: "The apostles were commanded to go into all the world and to
preach the gospel to every creature; they did not go to any such part of tile world as
the antipodes; they did not preach to any creatures there: ergo. no antipodes exist."Quoted in I A. WHITE, A HISTORY OF THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE wVirit TlEOLOGY IN
CHRISTENDOM 108 (Dover ed. 1960).
11. A. HALL, THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 1500-1800, at 122-23 (2d ed. 1962).
12. N. HAMPSON, A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 19, 34, 36 (1968).
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and unheard of ways of finding truth contrary to all the teachings
of the fathers!13
Critics of traditional thought were groping toward the new method-
ology of scientific inference. Acceptance and refinement of their
techniques ultimately rendered witchcraft prosecutions unjustifiable
by destroying the world view on which they were based and by making
untenable the procedures necessary to determine the guilt of those
accused. Nevertheless, as Fox asserts: "[T]he law was keeping very
much in step with the scientific thought of the day. What emerges as
the really difficult historical task is to identify any way in which law
enforcement against witches actually conflicted with science."14
Although some scientific discoveries called old beliefs into question,
most could be rationalized so as not to conflict with and often to sup-
port the religious doctrines of the times. Copernicus died in 1543.
By the end of the seventeenth century his arguments positing a helio-
centric universe were widely accepted. Rejection of geocentric concepts
was not accomplished without protest from the religious community:
Luther said that "People give ear to an upstart astrologer who
strove to show the earth revolves, not the heavens or the firma-
ment, the sun and the moon. Whoever wishes to appear clever
must devise some new system, which of all systems of course is the
very best. This fool wishes to reverse the entire science of astron-
omy; but sacred Scripture tells us that Joshua commanded the sun
to stand still, and not the earth." Melanchthon was equally em-
phatic; so was Calvin, who, after quoting the text: "The world
also is established, that it cannot be moved" (Ps. xciii, 1) trium-
phantly concluded, "Who will venture to place the authority of
Copernicus above that of the Holy Spirit?" Even Wesley, so late
as the eighteenth century, while not daring to be so emphatic,
nevertheless stated that the new doctrines in astronomy "tend
toward infidelity."' 5
Fox points out, however, that early cosmological discoveries were fre-
quently thought to buttress rather than undermine Biblical authority.
He notes that Joseph Glanvill, "the black villain in the witchcraft con-
13. Quoted in E. COOK & IV. GARNEa, PERCENrTAGE BASMALL, at viii (2d ed. 1966). The
conclusiveness of esteemed authority is revealed by a statute of Oxford University which
decreed "that Bachelors and Masters who did not follow Aristotle faithfully were liable
to a fine of five shillings for every point of divergence .... " RciSuA E. Jo.Es. AMcI NTs
AND MODERNS: A STUDy OF THE RISE OF THE SCIENTIFiC MfOVEMENT L SEvE.ETH.%%-CENTUrfY
ENGLAN'D 4 (2d ed. 1961).
14. Fox 110.
15. B. RussELL, RE UGION AND SCmENCE 23 (1935).
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troversy,"16 employed Copernican principles to demonstrate the exis-
tence of demons. Robert Burton based speculation concerning their
prevalence on contemporary calculations of the size of the universe:
The air is not so full of flies in summer as it is at all times of in-
visible devils .... [S]ome of our Mathematicians say: if a stone
could fall from the starry heaven . .. and should pass every hour
an hundred miles, it would be 65 years, or more, before it would
come to ground, by reason of the great distance of heaven from
earth, which contains, as some say, 170 million 803 miles ....
[H]ow many such spirits may it contain?17
Newton himself, accused of substituting gravitation for Providence,
asserted that "natural philosophy is subservient to purposes of a higher
kind, and is chiefly to be valued as it lays a sure foundation for natural
religion and moral philosophy .. .by leading us, in a satisfactory
manner, to the knowledge of the Author and Governor of the uni-
verse."1
8
Having established the insufficiency of evidence negating the ex-
istence of witches, Fox examines the impact of science on the proce-
dures employed during the trials to separate the guilty from the
innocent. In particular, he carefully analyzes the actual and potential
contributions of medical knowledge, which had been greatly augmented
during the seventeenth century. Fox argues that the Massachusetts
practitioner remained ignorant of many contemporary European dis-
coveries. More importantly, he concludes that medical advances could
have had little effect on the judicial process because witches were be-
lieved to act by exercising supernatural power over natural agents:
-[N]o matter what natural causes of death an autopsy might reveal, the
16. Fox 28.
17. Quoted in A. HUXLEY, THE DEVILS OF LOUDUN 171 (1965). Scriptural interpretation
yielded an alternative structure: "According to Cosmas, the earth is a parallelogram, flat,
and surrounded by four seas. It is four hundred days' journey long and two hundred
broad. At the outer edges of these four seas arise massive walls dosing in the whole
structure and supporting the . .. firmament, above which live the angels, a main part
of whose business it is to push and pull the sun and planets to and fro." 1 A. Wurrg,
supra note 10, at 93-94. St. Philastrius "pronounced it a heresy to deny that the stars
are brought out by God from his treasure-house and hung in the sky every evening ....
Id. 115.
18. Quoted in C. BEcKER, supra note 6, at 62. Early discoveries led to the conjecture
that prayer might prevent storms not through the direct intervention of God but by
the displacements it caused in the atmosphere. H. BuTrrmFiELD, Tni OIUGIN9 OF MODERN
SCIENCE 1300-1800, at 47 (rev. ed. 1965). Vestigial traces of the admixture of science and
theology persist: "Space research is made all the more fascinating by the possibility that
there are higher forms of life on other space bodies, perhaps some unaffected by original
sin." Statement by the Reverend Lawrence W. Friedrich, S.J., quoted in P. KAEL, KIss
Kiss BANG BANG 152-53 (1968).
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witch could still be held guilty for having brought about those causes."1
His efforts unduly divert attention from the methodology of science to
the discoveries resulting from application of this methodology. Scientific
analysis entails not merely use of inductive processes but also disregard
of those hypotheses which are not, at least in theory, empirically refut-
able.20 The tenuousness of tests relied on to justify conviction of the
witches was apparent even to those who did not doubt their existence.
In 1672 one believer admitted: "[Ilf anything in the world, (as we
know all things in the world are) be liable to fraud, and imposture,
and innocent mistake, through weakness and simplicity; this subject
of Witches and Spirits is."21 Development of new modes of thought
should have led initially to inquiry concerning the efficacy of techniques
of proof. That it did not appear was in part a consequence of the im-
portance of fundamental community religious beliefs. Doubt once
recognized could not long remain narrowly focused.
One test, used on the continent as late as 1836, offered little hope to
those accused regardless of their culpability: "Proof of their guilt was
mainly established in this wise: their feet and hands being bound
together they were thrown into the water. If they sank and were
drowned they were innocent; but if they remained floating on the
surface they were pronounced guilty, and were burnt."22 Other proce-
dures were ritualistic preludes to a predetermined conclusion: "The
magistrate had to put thirty-five questions to the suspect. The first
question alone was enough to send the witch to the stake, irrespective
of the others. It ran: 'Believest thou in witches?' If the accused answered
'yes' she was versed in witchcraft; if she answered 'no' she was guilty of
19. Fox 61 (emphasis in original). A similar view is prevalent in modem Africa. See
M,. GLUCKMAN, CUSTOm AND CoNFLICr IN AnReCA 81-108 (1965).
20. K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GRowut OF Scr-%Fic KNOWLEDGE
33-37 (1962).
21. Quoted in Fox 65. Parallel difficulties afflict modem decision processes. See Note.
Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 COLU.m. L. REv. 1137 (1957). Archaic German law
occasionally tested charges of rape through combat between the accused and the alleged
victim: "The chances between such unequaled adversaries were adjusted by placing the
man up to the navel in a pit three feet wide, tying his left hand behind his back, and
arming him only with a dub, while his fair opponent had the free use of her limbs and
was furnished with a stone as large as the fist, or weighing from one to five pounds.
fastened in a piece of stuff. . . . If the man was %anquished, he was beheaded; if the
woman, she only lost a hand, for the reason that the chances of the fight were against
her." Lea, The Wager of Battle, in Lw AND WARFARE: S-TUDIES IN E .VzMIRoPoLoGY or
CoNuacr 233, 244 (P. Bohannan ed. 1967).
22. H. HELNE, RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY IN GmasANY 30 U' Snodgrass transl. 1959).
British practice permitted some control over result: "It was easy to produce the desired
verdict, for a rope was tied around the victim's waist and each end was held by two
men on opposite banks of the stream or pond. It required very little ingenuity to prevent
the victim from sinking by a slightly camouflaged strain on the rope." R. SETH, STonmS
OF GREAT WVrrca TRALs 99 (1967).
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heresy." 23 Torture to elicit confession was rationalized not only as a
safeguard, preventing execution of the innocent, but also, and more
reasonably, as a means of inducing penitence and thus saving the soul
of the person charged.24 The reliability of accusations made by demons
tormenting the possessed was vociferously debated by theologians. Al-
though all agreed that such spirits were generally untrustworthy, some
argued that under priestly constraint they could not speak falsely. The
most authoritative statement concerning this problem was issued in
1610 by doctors of the Faculty of Paris. Quoting St. Thomas, they
urged that "[t]he devil must not be believed, even when he tells the
truth."25
Those involved in the colonial trials manifested a greater concern
for due process than their European counterparts. A 1692 essay
vigorously attacked the proposition that legal safeguards should be
restricted because they made conviction difficult:
This is a dangerous Principle, and contrary to the mind of God,
who hath appointed that there shall be good and clear proof
against the Criminal; else he is not Providentially delivered into
the hands of Justice, to be taken off from the earth. Nor hath God
exempted this case of Witchcraft from the General Rule. Besides,
reason tells us, that the more horrid the Crime is, the more
Cautious we ought to be in making any guilty of it.20
Modes of proof nevertheless remained questionable. Judges relied on
spectral evidence, believing on theological grounds that no innocent
person could be represented by an apparition. Reactions of a sufferer
to the touch of the accused were also weighed. Midwives searched de-
fendants for witch marks, held to include a wide but poorly defined
range of dermatological irregularities. Inability to weep on demand
and even apparent extreme piety could indicate guilt.27 The propensity
of the Salem judges to hang those protesting innocence and release
those admitting guilt makes the infrequency of their use of torture to
coerce confession appear uncharitable.
28
23. R. LEWINSOHN, A HISTORY OF SEXUAL CUSTOMS 126 (1958).
24. Willingness to discount earthly suffering given the prospect of eternal life Is
best illustrated by the perhaps apocryphal directive of Amalric Arnaud, Abb6 of Citeaux
and later Archbishop of Narbonne, during the Albigensian Crusade. At the sack of B36ziers
in 1209 his soldiers asked him how they were to distinguish between Catholics anti
heretics. He reputedly replied: "Tuez-les tons, Dieu reconnaltra les sicrs." A BOOK OF
FRENcH QUOrATONS 8 (N. Guterman ed. 1963).
25. Quoted in A. HUXLEY, supra note 17, at 153.
26. Quoted in Fox 75-76.
27. 1 C. UPHA , SALEM WITCHCRAFT 409-11 (1959); 2 id. 39.
28. Drake, supra note 1, at 712-13, 725.
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Humanitarian concern was an uncommon motive for scrutiny of
trial procedures. Isolated protests against cruelty could be answered
from utilitarian premises by demonstrating the need to protect the
uncorrupted from infection. The disparity between seventeenth-cen-
tury and modern attitudes is perhaps best grasped by the realization
that "[t]o define the pleasure of the elect as the sight of their brothers
burning and howling in fire and brimstone no longer seems a satis-
factory account of beatitude."2 9
From his evaluation of the impact of scientific advances on the ad-
judicatory process Fox concludes that the procedures employed in the
Massachusetts trials seem rational in the light of the beliefs concerning
witchcraft which formed the basis of the persecutions. That these
beliefs are compatible with other elements of the culture in which they
were embedded seems to be accepted as evidence of their rationality. In
one sense such reasoning is tautological, since any practice can pre-
sumably be explained by reference to societal patterns. The response
selected remains undifferentiated from other intuitively plausible
responses to the same environmental stimuli unless scrutiny is extended
to the less conscious needs of those involved. A more penetrating
analysis of community beliefs would arguably reduce them to a set of
rationalizations which permitted constrained satisfaction of elemental
drives. That witchcraft myths facilitated expression in fantasy of cul-
turally disallowed desires is indicated by the prominence of sexual
associations among the thoughts of the persecutors. Malleus Malefica-
rum, their guide, informed them that "God permits more bewitchment
to be performed in relation to the generative powers than in any other
department of human life, the reason being that, since the Fall, there
exists in everything that pertains to sex 'a greater corruption than in the
case of other human actions.' "30 A psychoanalytic explanation of the
colonists' unwillingess fully to adopt scientific methodology in in-
vestigating accusations of witchcraft is at least tenable.
Professor Sheldon Glueck opens his foreword to the book with a
reminder by Holmes that historical research has value primarily as an
aid in solving present problems. Fox relates his study to modern legal
29. G. BoAs, THE CHALLENGE OF ScINcE 87 (1965).
30. A. HurXEy, supra note 17, at 127. In 1484 Pope Innocent VIII "ssued the Bull
Summis desirantes affectibus, in which he expressed his anxiety about intercourse with
the devil: 'Not without immense grief have I recently learned that in certain parts of
Germany, particularly in the regions of Mainz, Trier. Salsburg and Bremer. verv many
persons of both sexes, forgetful of their own weal and straying from the path' of thb
Catholic Church, have sinfully consorted with devils in male and female fonn." R.
LEWINSOHN, supra note 23, at 125-26.
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practice by making it the basis of a plea for greater use by the courts of
the techniques and findings of science. His analysis is instructive in
additional ways.
Persecution for witchcraft remains common in much of the world.1a
Eradication of the practice requires not only scientifically adequate
refutation of the specific beliefs which support it but also negation of
the underlying cultural attitudes which induce rejection of scientific
methodology: "Of course it is pretty obvious that there are good
scientific reasons for preferring science to magic, but then, presumably,
there would be good magical reasons for preferring magic to science."3 2
The effectiveness of demonstrably false accusations against racial and
political minorities in communities sharing the Western heritage in-
dicates that the availability of objective decision processes may limit
but cannot preclude irrational intolerance. Trevor-Roper characterizes
the European persecutions as the articulation of social pressure formed
from reactions to psychological stereotypes dictated by popular super-
stition operating within an approved cosmology.13 Kluckhohn states:
[U]nless there are some forms of hating which are socially approved
and justified, everyone will remain in an intolerable conflict situa-
tion, and neuroticism will be endemic in the population .... It
would be too much to say that all societies must necessarily have
their "witches," i.e., persons whom it is proper to fear and hate
and, under defined circumstances, to behave aggressively toward.
... But no culture which has yet been described leaves "witches"
out of its definition of the situation for every sector of life or for
every group within the society.3 4
Nor has modem man completely abandoned the discredited evidentiary
techniques employed in witchcraft investigations:
If... the commander of a "Huey Hog" helicopter ... finds noth-
ing overtly suspicious, he is entitled to stir up some action by drop-
ping smoke grenades in places where he suspects something might
be going on. If people run from the smoke and explosion, the
31. "Seven witch doctors arrested here admitted they had created hailstorms and
destroyed crops because villagers had refused to pay their annual fee for occult weather
control." Tanzania Jails 7 for "Magic", N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1968, at 16, col. 6.
32. J. SMART, BETWEEN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 16 (1968). "[O]f all forms of mental
activity, the most difficult to induce . . .is the art of handling the same bundle of data
as before, but placing them in a new system of relations with one another by giving them
a different framework . . . . It is easy to teach anybody a new fact .. .but it needs
light from heaven to . . .break the old framework . . . into which he will fit ...new
information. ... H. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 18, at 13-14.
33. H. TREVOR-ROPER, THE CRISIS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: RELIGION, Tin RE.
FORMATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 190-91 (1966).
34. C. KLUCKHOHN, NAVAHO WITCHCRAFT 51-52 (1944) (emphasis in original).
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pilot is then entitled to assume he has flushed Charlie and to call
in any means of destruction at his disposal.... [W]hy would they
run if they didn't have guilty consciences? 35
Procedural safeguards offer only imperfect protection against the dan-
gers of this approach.
Whitehead urged that before a discipline can become a science it
must first lose its memory. Over the centuries witchcraft prosecutions
acquired a patina of legitimacy. Glanvil, for example, asserted that
denial of the existence of witches entailed the belief that "all Histories
are Romances; that all the wiser would have agreed together to juggle
mankind into a common belief of ungrounded fables; that the sound
senses of multitudes together may deceive them, and Laws are built
upon Chymera's; that the gravest and wisest Judges have been Murderers
and the sagest persons Fools, or designing Imposters .... 3G2 Institu-
tionalization of responses was then and is today accompanied by the
growth of groups within the community united by an interest in
perpetuating the values it enshrines. Especially on the Continent, those
charged with controlling witchcraft were frequently more interested
in assuring the expansion of the industry37 than in achieving social
35. Crichton, Book Review, N.Y. REv. oF Boors, Jan. 4, 1968, at 3, 4.
36. Quoted in Fox 30. Here suffering appears to provide its own justification:
An institution which is legitimate has the capacity to demand sacrifice, that is.
negative payoffs. This means, however, that we easily fall into what I have called
a "sacrifice trap." If we once begin making sacrifices for something, the admission
that the sacrifices were in vain would be a threat to our internal legitimacy. Hence
we tend to create the integrative relationship which would justify the sacrifices.
People make sacrifices, for instance, for a king, or for their country, or for their
religion. Even though these sacrifices may originally have been made in the ex-
pectation of eventual positive payoffs, where these payoffs are vague, abstract, hard
to perceive, or perhaps in the distant future, the sacrifices have to be justified in the
present in terms of the establishment of what might be called a legitimacy of
sacredness. Sacrifices create sacredness and sacredness justifies sacrifices. . . .The
pattern here is that sacrifice creates legitimacy, which demands more sacrifice, which
creates more legitimacy, and this process goes on building up until somebody finally
says, "To hell with it," and the whole institution collapses.
Boulding, The Legitimacy of Economics, 5 W. EcoN. J. 299, 300-01 (1967).
37. Currie, Crimes Without Criminals: Witchcraft and Its Control in Renaissance
Europe, 3 LAw & Soc'r Rzv. 7 (Nov. 1968).
In twenty-two villages [in Trier] 368 witches were burnt between 1587 and 1593,
and two villages, in 1585, were left with only one female inhabitant apiece ....
Dietrich Flade, rector of the university and chief judge of the electoral court
judged the victims leniently. Consequently the prince-archbishop had him arrested,
accused of witchcraft himself, tortured till he confessed whatever wvas put to him,
strangled and burnt. This put a stop to leniency by judges, and the population of
Trier continued to shrink. As it shrank, the executioner, like some solitary cannibal,
swelled in pride and sleekness, and rode about on a fine horse, "like a nobleman of
the court, dressed in silver and gold, while his wife vied with noblewomen in dress
and luxury."
H. Tamvoa-Ropinz, supra note 33, at 150.
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justice. Suppliers and consumers of military equipment may play a
parallel role in modern America. 38
In 1458 Chief Justice Fortescue asserted that a rule "laid down ever
since the law began" must have been created "for good reason, though
we cannot at present remember that reason." 39 This attitude is not
peculiar to the common law:
In the year A.D. 61 the prefect of the city of Rome, Pedanius
Secundus, was murdered by one of the slaves in his town house.
Under the law, not only the culprit but all the other slaves in the
household had to be executed, in this instance numbering four
hundred. There was a popular outcry and the Senate debated the
question. Some senators rose to plead clemency, but the day was
carried by the distinguished jurist, Gaius Cassius Longinus, who
argued that all change from ancestral laws and customs is always
for the worse. When a mob tried to prevent the sentence from
being carried out, the emperor personally intervened on the side
of the law, though he rejected another proposal that Pedanius's
ex-slaves should also be punished by banishment. That, he said,
would be unnecessary cruelty.40
The Salem trials did not end in eradication of the local witch popula-
tion. When the proceedings were discontinued, seven persons sen-
tenced to death were yet unexecuted and more than fifty others were in
prison awaiting trial. Accusations against at least two hundred addi-
tional individuals remained untested.41 As is typical in such cases, the
magnitude of the error which became evident ultimately compelled
belated reevaluation of the attitudes which induced it.
38. See L. LEWIN, REPORT FROm IRON MOUNTAIN ON TIE POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY
OF PEACE (1967).
89. Y.B. 36 Hen. 6, f. 25b, pl. 26 (1458).
40. Finley, Book Review, N.Y. REv. OF BooKs, Jan. 26, 1967, at 6.
41. S. MORISON, THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 262 (2d ed. 1956).
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Populist in the Pulpit
WAalter F. Murphyt
MT. Justice Murphy: A Political Biography. 
By J. Woodford Howard.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1968. Pp. xii, 578. S12.50.
From 1924 until 1930 Frank Murphy 
was a criminal court judge in
Detroit. His service there earned him 
a reputation as an active and
effective reformer of the local judicial system. 
Moving upwards on the
political ladder, he became a 
progressive mayor of that depression-
blasted city, a mayor whose social conscience 
insisted on a massive public
duty to help the jobless and the destitute. Appointed 
by Roosevelt in
1933 as Governor General of and later 
High Commissioner to the
Philippine Islands, he viewed his task as 
essentially anti-colonial: to
give the Filipinos self-determination as rapidly 
as possible while using
the interval to strengthen political stability 
and to inoculate the new
rulers with a concern for social justice. Still later, 
just after taking
office in 1937 as the fourth Democratic 
governor in Michigan's history,
he was confronted with the great sit-down 
strikes of the 1930's. He
handled those crises with patience, 
tact, and courage, eventually set-
tling them ithout bloodshed but at 
the price of defeat for reelection.
In 1938 when FDR gave him the Department 
of Justice as a tempo-
rary base until something better could 
be turned up, Murphy became
a crusading Attorney General. Speaking 
loudly and carrying a small
stick, he prosecuted the Pendergast 
boys in Missouri, chased some of
the remnants of Huey Long's machine 
in Louisiana, and laid plans to
battle Boss Hague in Jersey City. 
Following policies similar to those
that he had established in Detroit and 
Lansing, Murphy tried to carry
out his preachments on good government 
by reforming the personnel
structure of the Department of Justice. 
As anyone familiar with the
conspiratorial skills of lawyers
-turned 'bureau cr a ts would have predicted,
his reform plans were largely sabotaged. 
In his external operations as
Attorney General, Murphy displayed a typical 
mixture of methods and
motives: at the same time that he 
was establishing the Civil Rights
Section, he was cooperating with the 
Dies Committee and prosecuting
Spanish Loyalists in Detroit.
t vIcCormick Professor of jurisprudence, Princeton University. 
AMl. 1950. University
of Notre Dame; A.M. 1954, George 
washington University; Ph.D. 1957, 
University of
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With America on the verge of involvement in World War II, Murphycoveted the post of Secretary of War. Roosevelt, however, had learnedfrom Woodrow Wilson's experience with William Jennings Bryanand was unwilling to give a near-pacifist a critical cabinet post on theeve of war. Instead, the President nominated Murphy for the SupremeCourt.Murphy is now generally thought of as an avid New Dealer, both onand off the bench; but, as Howard shows, party was never a primaryconsideration in Murphy's thinking. Politics was to him a personalaffair; he was far more at home-and effective-in the non-partisancampaigns of Detroit than in welding together a state organization orin playing a team role in a nation-wide coalition. Indeed, his friend-ships with men like William Randolph Hearst and Father Coughlinand his close affiliations with the American Legion were among thereasons why FDR was initially attracted to Murphy; the President sawhim as a bridge to the political right.These anomalies are all part of larger patterns of character and be-havior. Murphy was a consummate and vain showman, a flamboyantextrovert, a lonely, restless bundle of political energy, an incurabledreamer, a populist mystic, a galavanting socialite, a devoted democratand occasional demagogue, an intelligent politician but never an in-tellectual, an impetuous, impulsive, erratic, and at times creative ad-ministrator who always took deeply seriously his own pious pronounce-ments about good government. Where his own family was concerned,of course, many of the rules were off and Murphy could act as anhonest though insensitive nepotist. Throughout his public life he sawhimself as a dedicated knight, in search of some maidens to rescue andothers, often from the chorus line, to romance. He took reform seri-ously, but as in all his work, he was a frequently sanctimonious, a some-times frustrated and an always dramatic evangelist. These qualities mademany professional politicians doubt the extent of his commitment toliberalism. They were wrong but Murphy helped them err. Felix Frank-furter once told Murphy that the critical problem with which hisbiographer would have to wrestle was the fact that he violated theconstitutional command of separation of church and state: he was atthe same time priest and judge. William Allen White was no lesscogent when he commented that "Men like Murphy make poor heroesbut they also make history that is easier to read."'
1. Emporia Gazette, Aug. 4, 1937; quoted in J. HOWARD, M. JUsTIcE MuRPIjy: A POLIT-ICAL BIOGRAPHY 179 (1968) [hereinafter cited as HOWARD].
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Murphy's political successes were mixed with failures, but while he
was often depressed he seldom despaired. He truly believed in himself
as a white knight with the holy mission of imparting social justice.
Cervantes would have loved him; so would Sancho Panza. Leo XIII's
Rerum Novarum, Murphy said, was the bedrock of his faith, supporting
the "Goddess of Reason and the Sermon on the Mount."2
One would have expected Frank Murphy, whose virtues were of the
heart and soul rather than of the intellect, to be neither happy nor
successful on the Supreme Court, though FDR jokingly chided him
that he had found his ideal place-with the Constitution behind him
and the Bible before him. At times Murphy was not happy on the
Court, and his victories there, as in other aspects of politics, were ac-
companied by defeats, some due to personal defects, some to the
short-sightedness of others. But eventually he became reconciled to his
judicial robes, or perhaps he reconciled his fellow Justices to Murphy.
"The Great Pulpit" he termed the Supreme Court at the time of his
nomination; and after a few groping and painfully insecure years, he
made full-some said fulsome-use of that pulpit. "The greatest duty
of a statesman is to educate,"3 he claimed, and his opinions were efforts
to make good that claim.
He made some contributions to labor law and Indian law, but it
was civil liberties in general and the first amendment in particular
that carried him forward and turned his initially unpleasant service on
the Court into another crusade. His Falbo dissent expressed it all: "The
law knows no finer hour than when it cuts through formal concepts and
transitory emotions to protect unpopular citizens against discrimination
and persecution."4 This was not an isolated piece of eloquence. As one
wag quipped, in the Supreme Court justice was often "tempered with
Murphy." Alone among the brethren he prepared a dissent in Hira-
bayashi v. United States,5 bitterly condemning Court and country for
betraying the Nisei. Frankfurter talked him out of publishing that
opinion, but Murphy was not to be budged when Korematsu came up.,
His protest against the ugly racism of concentration camps can stand
as good literature as well as good law alongside the warnings of Holmes
and Brandeis against the dangers of lesser forms of intolerance.
For Murphy the judge no less than Murphy the politician, civil
2. HowARD 443.
3. Id. 491.
4. Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 556 (1944).
5. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
6. Korematsu v. United States, 323 US. 214, 233 (1944).
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liberties was simply "the idea of human dignity . . . translated into
actuality."7 "What a supreme joy it is ," he said as he luxuriated in
righteousness, "to have no other mission in life than to lift one's pen
in defense of freedom of conscience and the security and equal justice
to the inarticulate."8
Such is the portrait that comes out of Howard's book. Clearly the
picture has been painted by a skilled artist. But a political scientist
has difficulties in either writing or judging biography since by training
and inclination he looks to the general, while biography deals with
the particular-and, unfortunately, usually as a unique congeries of
specific instances, not as a case study possibly representative of a larger
set of phenomena.
If it were useful only as a guide to Murphy's character, as interesting
as that may be, the book might not have been worth either the long
years of drudgery9 or the opportunity costs involved to the author or
reader. For, though Murphy was a good judge, a better judge than
more partisan and less well informed critics have claimed, he was still
not a great judge. Nevertheless, a well-done biography of a Supreme
Court Justice can perform a number of functions from which the
lawyer and political scientist can share benefits, if not necessarily
equally.'0 Among the more important functions of these are (1) to sup-
ply the lay reader with general knowledge about the judiciary and its
surrounding political system and to increase the knowledge of the pro-
fessional, (2) to analyze the character of the Justice and to outline the
nature of the office he held and the uses to which he put that office, (3)
to reconstruct the values that influenced the Justice in his decision-mak-
ing, that is, to illuminate his jurisprudence, (4) to place the man and the
institution in the context of their times, (5) to throw light on the group
phase of the Court's decisional processes, (6) to describe at least some of
the various sets of roles that the Court can play in the political system,
7. HOWARD 206.
8. Id. 299.
9. The book was 14 years in the making.
10. J. GARRr Y, THE NATURE OF BIOGRAPHY 105 (1957) quotes one authority as sayingthere are "only three motives for writing biography; one wishes either to erect a nionu-
ment to a departed loved one, or to set an example for future generations, or to make
money." Cited in J.W. Peltason, Supreme Court Biography, in ESSAYS ON THE AMERICANCONsTrruTION 217 (G. Dietze ed. 1964). Peltason goes on to list seven functions of judicialbiography: (1) to inspire; (2) to instruct; (3) to supply a framework for a discussion ofpublic policy and/or political philosophy; (4) to provide a means of holding judges to
account; (5) to illuminate the part and so to establish the historical perspective necessaryto understand law, courts, and judges; (6) to study the interaction and importance ofpsychological variables in the lives and work of government officials; and (7) to describe
what happens behind the scenes, to get at those factors in the immediate environment of
the judges which influenced behavior. Id. 217 et seq.
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and (7) to provide useful data for scholars whose interest in a particular
Justice or even in the Supreme Court is only incidental.
Certainly on the first four counts Howard's book comes off very well.
It is written in a lively, often elegant style and is based on sound gen-
eral scholarship and on a sensitive feel for the technical aspects of the
judicial process as well as for the play of personality in that process.
Not least it it is grounded on prodigious research in literally millions
of pages of unpublished letters, memoranda, conference notes, opinion
drafts, and docket books that can be found in the papers of Justices
Murphy, Burton, and Frankfurter. What is in this biography should
teach the expert as well as the casual observer about Murphy, about
the Supreme Court generally, about the politics of the two decades from
1929 to 1949, and a great deal about the American political system as
a whole.
It is, however, on the final three counts that this biographical study
will have its most lasting effect. The study focuses intense light on the
inner workings of the Court, the high intellectual standards the Justices
set for themselves, and the patient negotiations, even bargainings n re-
quired for majority, much less unanimous, opinions from intelligent,
determined, strong-minded men. By illustrating how Murphy used the
Supreme Court as his Great Pulpit, Howard has also given a convincing
demonstration of one of the Court's more important roles, that of
educator, or, in current jargon, that of political socializer of the better
informed, and through a trickling-down process, perhaps also of the
general public.'
On the last count, that of supplying raw material useful to other
scholars, Howard again scores high. This book, coupled with Alpheus
T. Mason's volumes on Stone and Taft,13 forms a data bank for students
with such diverse interests as the workings of the judicial process, de-
cision-making-with or without particular reference to judges-po-
litical recruitment generally and judicial recruitment specifically, the
politics of the New Deal, and the nature of political leadership in
American society. Moreover, although he himself does not generalize,
11. See W. F. MURPHY, ELnEENrs OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964), especially ch. 3.
12. Cf. H. BERMAN, JusTicE IN THE U.S.S.R. ch. 16 (rev. ed. 1963). for a discuvion of a
more inclusive notion of socialization through law. what Bennan calls the concept of
"parental law."
13. HARLAN FisKE STONE, PILLAR OF THE Lsw (1956); WILLIM Howw TAFT. CuIna'
JUSTICE (1964). Mason's BRANDEIS: A FREE ,MAN's LIFE (1946) is still the best overall portrait
of Brandeis the man, but Mason was denied access to Brandcis's papers pertaining to his
work on the Court so the book's utility in understanding the judicial process is Iess than
that of the two later studies.
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Howard has left the way open for others to do so. A biography, what-
ever the intentions of the biographer, can be viewed as a case study.
Even though one cannot prove or disprove explanations from a single
instance or even from a number of single instances, case studies can
sharpen understanding of the nature of the problems to be explained
and suggest tentative solutions to those problems.' 4 Howard's book does
much to clarify a whole range of problems involving judges, though it
does not proceed very far, at least explicitly,; in advancing solutions.
I wish that Howard had been more daring and had gone beyond his
copious data to offer, however tentatively, some general explanations
about judicial decision-making as well as about the legitimate political
roles the Court can play in the American system. And I do not agree
with Howard's assertion that statutory interpretation is apt to be as
permanent as constitutional interpretation.6 Finally, I believe that
underlying Murphy's work was a coherent, however roughhewn, juris-
prudence, which is evidenced by much of the material in this book, and
I wish that Howard had further developed this aspect of Murphy's
character. Still, when such cavils are registered, I cannot escape the
conclusion that this is a major contribution to the literature on the
American Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Murphy was begun as a doctoral
dissertation under the direction of Professor Alpheus T. Mason. He
must feel a deep sense of pride in what one of his very best students
has achieved here.
14. See N. HANSON, PATERNS OF DISCOVERY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONCEPTUAL FOUN-
DATIONS OF SCIENCE (1959).
15. In a separate article, On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 62 A,. POL. Sci. REv. 43(1968), Howard has used some of the data from the Murphy Papers to challenge the
assumption of some writers that a judge's values are accurately mirrored in his votes
as published in official reports.
16. HowARD 382.
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Delinquents and Nondelinquents in Perspective. By Sheldon and El-
eanor Glueck. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Pp. xx,
268. $8.50.
Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck have devoted tremendous energy, per-
sistence, and thought to problems of delinquency. In a less perverse
world they would, before now, have been rewarded with the discovery
of some very powerful answers. They have been no less successful than
others, but it must be a great disappointment to them that despite their
devoted and thorough work, their conclusions are challenged and their
methods of analysis subjected to considerable criticism.
This new book' takes their previous studies further in one important
respect-the follow-up period is still further extended. The juveniles
studied and reported in their earlier work2 are now studied at their
twenty-fifth and thirty-first birthdays. Of the original 500 delinquents
438 were traced, as were 442 of the 500 nondelinquents. It is a demon-
stration of their own diligence and that of their associates that such a
high proportion of the cases could be located after so many years. How-
ever, when they say, "We think the reader will agree ... that there is
a sufficient number of cases . . . to present reliable findings,"3 a statis-
tician would express some doubts. Bias due to attrition is a serious pos-
sibility, even with a high proportion of successful contacts. In a study
of 700 cases carried out by the reviewer, among the first 300 cases recov-
ered the recidivist rate was 30 per cent, while among the last 56 cases of
the 700 recovered the recidivist rate was 82 per cent. The recidivist rate
for the total sample was 55 per cent. If ways for tracing information
about all the cases had not been available, this important fact would
have remained unknown. Perhaps one should be less critical of this
failure to recover some of the delinquent cases since about equal num-
bers of delinquents and nondelinquents were traced.4 It appears, how-
ever, that probably more effort was put into tracing some individuals
rather than others,5 and certainly the number of information sources
t Dean, School of Criminology, University of California, Berkeley.
1. S. & E. GLUECK, DELINQUENTs AND NONDELINQUENTS IN PERSPECTIVE (196S) (herein-
after cited as DELINQUENTS).
2. S. 9- E. GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DEUNQUENCY (1951).
3. DELmQuENTs xviX.
4. Id. 438, 442.
5. See p. 734 infra.
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differed as between the delinquent and nondelinquent cases." In a bal-
anced and matched sample it is difficult to assess the dangers of non-
response and loss of information.
Despite the thoroughness with which the authors pursue their data,
the phrasing of their comments is often loose. They say, for example,
"It is common knowledge that the great majority of children... do not
become delinquent .... .7.There are studies, using self-report tech-
niques, which would suggest that this "generally known" fact is not so.8
In any event, only a small percentage of all juveniles are adjudicated
delinquent or have been arrested, while the proportion of legally iden-
tified and defined delinquents is perhaps almost a fifth of the relevant
population. In the "vicious environment" and "antisocial subculture"
to which the authors refer in continuing this statement," the proportion
is certainly higher. The phrasing of this comment suggests a bias of the
authors which deemphasizes the influence of poverty, deprivation, and
other social factors as causes of delinquency and favors individual fac-
tors-nature rather than nurture.
It is, perhaps, not unexpected that this conclusion should be reached
from the authors' data, since they matched their samples of delinquent
and nondelinquents in relation to residence in under-privileged areas.
Any variable which is "standardized" out of the experimental design in
the first place cannot appear later in the analyses. If it did, it would
only indicate that the standardization was not properly carried out.
What is much more important, standardization by only one variable
eliminates not only the probability of its appearing in the final analyses,
but also the appearance of all other variables with which the standard-
izing variable happens to be correlated. These patterns of correlation
are seldom, if ever, examined by any research workers using matching
designs. The authors of this book are no exception.
Perhaps an example should be given of this problem. It has been
shown that economic status and measured verbal intelligence are highly
correlated. Standardization by intelligence test score will reduce or
eliminate the probability of identifying economic status in other anal-
yses as well as (obviously) that of intelligence itself. Given a fixed eco-
nomic status (high or low) we may, of course, identify other factors
6. See p. 734 infra.
7. DELINQUENTS 3 (emphasis in original).
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related to delinquency. But since economic status is (by definition)
given, we can make no statements about its effect. If all sociologists
standardize by psychological factors, and all psychologists standardize
by sociological factors, neither will ever need to recognize the signif-
icance of the other's discipline. The factors which form the basis of the
other's study will not appear very significant in any analyses.
The authors matched cases not only by residential area but also by
general intelligence as measured by the Wechsler-Bellevue Full Scale.
As noted above, economic class and intelligence tend to be positively
correlated. What if the more intelligent offenders were less likely to be
caught? It is interesting to speculate what effect this further correlation
might have on the data if it were so. An interesting item of evidence
which reflects some unknown interaction with reference to the intel-
ligence variable is revealed in Table XIII-4.A The table shows that for
those who went into the Army, despite the standardization by intelli-
gence test scores in the first place, these scores, where available, were
lower for delinquents than nondelinquents.
In medical clinical trials and related fields it is accepted that com-
parative studies must be of the "double-blind" design-those perform-
ing the experiment must not be able to distinguish the placebo from the
active preparation. The Gluecks noted in their book, however, that the
"home investigators got the distinct impression that the parents of de-
linquents were actually unaware of many of the boys' activities.""1 Thus
it seems that the interviewers knew whether the parent's child was a
delinquent or a control. Studies in perceptual processes have established
that the "set" of the observer has a considerable impact upon the ob-
servations. No matter how honest the field workers were, the knowledge
of the group to which the interviewee belonged would probably bias
their perceptions. Attempts to compensate for possible bias might be
even more biasing; where the proper classification of the information
recorded can be determined only with a fair degree of uncertainty,
peripheral knowledge is likely to affect the classification given the data
more significantly than in the case of recording of hard data. On the
same page the authors present some figures and comment that "only a
handful ... of the delinquents' mothers, in sharp contrast to ... the
nondelinquents', met the happy and wholesome standard of both firm-
ness and kindliness in their disciplinary practices. '"-" Assessment of this
10. Id. 133.
11. Id. 15 (emphasis added).
12. Id.
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"standard" might cause a "halo effect"13 to occur and be of some con-
siderable size in relation to the proportion of cases involved.
The authors state further that they "made a determined effort to
search for positive evidence of the presence of serious physical and
mental disorders in at least one member [of the family group]."14 The
authors assure us that the "positive search" was as thoroughly conducted
whether the case was delinquent or a control. This assurance, of course,
can be accepted; but at the same time many scientists would take the
view that it would have been methodologically more sophisticated to
rely upon rigor in the design rather than to attempt to control the
degree of effort. This is particularly true here, since there can be no
quantitative measure of the effort expended.
A further design feature which subsequent studies should take into
consideration is revealed in Table IV-1.'3 The sources of information
for delinquents numbered more than 11 in 61.4 per cent and 18.9 per
cent in the first and second follow-up studies respectively; for nonde-
linquents the same proportions were 20.4 per cent and 4.5 per cent.
Thus more than three times as many sources were originally consulted
in both parts of the study. People seldom agree completely with others
in their assessment of people. And it has been shown in studies of pa-
rolees that the probability of an adverse comment is not independent
of the number of commentators. Unfortunately, the authors do not give
an analysis of the proportions of adverse comments in terms of the
number of sources.
In sum, much more rigor in the research design would have been
desirable. As a result, the findings are not sufficiently certain to risk
acting as if they were true. They may be, or they may not be. Nonethe-
less, the general fact which the authors' work has underlined must be
accepted, namely, that prediction of delinquency is possible-not com-
plete prediction, but probabilities may be estimated within close limits.
What then? It must not be assumed that because we can "predict" we
shall be able to say what we ought to do. Bayesian estimates may be used
to guide decisions if the available decision variety in the system can be
spelled out. It is necessary to estimate the utilities as well as the proba-
bilities if we are to discuss rational decisions. Any decision (even when
I3. The "halo effect" is a commonly used term in psychological or sociological
measurement. It refers to the demonstrated tendency of raters to assess any particular trait
as concordant with their general impression of the person. For some recent detailed ex-
amples, see G. LINDZEY & A. ELLIOT, THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 488-90 (2d
ed. 1968), or any other general textbook of psychological measurement.
14. DELINQUENTS 17 n.2.
15. Id. 47.
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given the best "predictions" and the most reliable basic data) must
accommodate the residual uncertainty. And this residue may never be
small; in the present state of our knowledge it is very large indeed. Our
problems concern what is rational action under conditions of uncer-
tainty. Ways for modifying uncertainty are known and should be ex-
plored, but modified uncertainty is not the same as certainty, even in
operational terms.
Apparently many think that if a person is likely to commit further
crimes after being given a period of treatment, then that likelihood is
reduced by giving him more or longer treatment. Unfortunately this
hypothesis is not correct. On the other hand, in this book the authors
emphasize again their theory of maturation out of delinquency. They
point out, quite correctly, that as children get older the crime rates drop.
Therefore, they conclude it is worthwhile to examine their hypothesis
of "delayed maturation."'" They summarize their own data by stating,
"[T]he fact should be emphasized that, while an appreciable proportion
of the original delinquents either abandoned crime altogether or be-
came petty nuisance offenders, it still remains true that three-fifths of
them were committing serious crimes during the 17-25 age-span and
three-tenths of them were doing so during the second follow-up
period."17 In this factual finding the present results do not differ much
from all other studies of this kind. The facts cannot be disputed; how-
ever, the facts do not necessarily support the simple inference of a
"maturation" factor. The assumption of maturation would require
that the probability of an individual offender committing further
offenses decreases with increasing age. It is difficult to demonstrate this
because it has also been shown that the probability that a person will
commit a further offense increases with the number of prior offenses.
(Indeed the authors themselves have shown this.s) Thus, conditional
probabilities, not simple direct probabilities, must be considered before
much can be said on this issue.
The authors, perhaps, find themselves in some dilemma in this con-
nection because they see crime as a kind of "state-of-the-individual,"
not as an "event," the probability of which is our concern. Most
criminals, most of the time, are not committing crimes. If criminal
behavior were continuous behavior it would be a quite different
phenomenon. It cannot be said that a person is a criminal, but only
16. E.g., id. 170.
17. Id. 170.
18. See S. & E. GLuEcK, FIVr HUNDRED CRIMINAL CASES (1930).
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that in an interval of time he committed one or more criminal acts.
Thus a much more complex model is in issue than that put forward by
the authors, because the object is to determine the probability of an
event occurring in an interval of time with reference to statements
about age, prior records (events in prior intervals), and similar issues.
There are methods whereby such data can be analyzed and estimates
made; but these methods are much more sophisticated than those used
by the authors. (The general term for such methods is "stochastic
processes.")
Doubtless, the appeal of this book, as of others by the authors, is the
apparent simplicity of their analyses. Unfortunately the phenomena
examined will not yield to simple analyses, and the authors do not see
anything deficient in their methods. They do conclude that the delin-
quency problem is "both enormous in scope and complex in content.
But it certainly can and should be attacked with more forethought,
intelligence, and patience than-according to the bleak evidence we
have laid before the reader-it has thus far received."10 This comment
is related to what ought to be done about delinquency, rather than
what ought to be done in delinquency research, but clearly the one
is inseparable from the other.
The authors' concluding statement about scope and complexity is a
welcome caution which the reviewer would like to have seen spread
more thoroughly throughout the work. For example, the authors state,
"The external, general culture .... while reflecting remote influences
indirectly involved in the background of both delinquents and non-
delinquents, are [sic] not nearly so determinative of delinquency... as
the quality of the parents . . . and the under-the-roof culture of the
home." 20 This may be so, but it is not proved (as has been noted) be-
cause of the standardization procedure. It may be possible that some
parents in the "ghetto" areas can instill into their children sets of "val-
ues" so that they will not break the law (or get caught), but in general it
is better to assume that those who commit delinquency are by the act
commenting not only upon themselves and their upbringing, but also
upon the sociopolitical cultural setting. To acknowledge complexity in
our present social system should not be disabling of all action but only
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agree that the situation, problems, and possibilities of action present
extremely complex issues. It is, however, most unfortunate that today
the degree of confidence with which views about crime are expressed
tend to be inversely proportional to knowledge.
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